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O
ver the past decade, inflation around the globe has dropped–so
much that the worldwide average has plummeted from 30
percent to 4 percent (Rogoff). For many countries, especially
those starting out with high inflation rates, falling inflation has been
desirable. But the experiences of other countries have raised the question
of whether inflation can be too low. In some economies, inflation has
dipped to levels that risk disruption of the normal functioning of the
economy. At the extreme, Japan and Hong Kong have experienced
deflation–a sustained decline in the aggregate price level, reflected in
negative inflation rates. In countries such as the United States, goods
prices have been falling, even though services prices continue to rise at a
healthy pace, keeping overall inflation positive.
Many commentaries on the potential for deflation in the United
States have noted the sharp contrast between goods and services prices.
Excluding food and energy, goods prices as measured by the chain price
index for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) dropped 21/4
percent in 2003. Yet nonenergy services prices rose nearly 21/ 2 percent
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19last year. Moreover, goods inflation has fallen sharply over the past
decade or so, while services inflation has declined only modestly. In
1993, PCE inflation was about 3/ 4 percent for goods and 31/ 4 percent for
services.
This article assesses whether the decline in consumer goods infla-
tion relative to services should be cause for concern in the United States.
The analysis focuses on three interrelated questions about the decline in
goods inflation relative to services: Was it unusual; what caused it; and
is it likely to continue? The first section examines the extent to which
the recent U.S. experience is unusual by historical and international
standards. The potential explanations evaluated in the second section
include: a deterioration in the accuracy of measured services inflation,
an increase in productivity growth for the goods sector compared to
services, rising demand for services relative to goods, and downward
pressures on goods prices due to the rising value of the dollar or height-
ened global competition. The third section assesses whether the falloff
in goods inflation relative to services is likely to persist. The article con-
cludes that, at present, there is little cause for concern in the United
States. The fall in goods inflation relative to services over the past
decade is most likely a temporary phenomenon due to dollar apprecia-
tion and, to a lesser extent, increased global competition.
I. U.S. HISTORICAL AND INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE
Economists have long known that goods inflation is normally well
below services inflation. In such historical context, the falloff in goods
inflation relative to services over the past decade may not be unusual for
the United States. Similarly, the recent U.S. experience may have been
shared by other industrialized economies. After first reviewing the infla-
tion measures used in the analysis, this section examines historical
movements in U.S. goods inflation relative to services and more recent
international evidence on the behavior of consumer goods and services
inflation.
1
Taken together, the historical U.S. and recent international evi-
dence reveal the past decade’s decline in core goods inflation relative to
services to be somewhat unusual and perhaps temporary. In the United
States, the differential between goods and services inflation has widened
20 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYfairly persistently over the past decade, reaching record or near-record
levels, depending on the measure of inflation. Some other industrialized
countries, such as the United Kingdom and Canada, also experienced a
significant falloff in goods inflation relative to services. In these foreign
economies, however, goods inflation relative to services reversed course
and rose in the last few years. Moreover, in Europe and Japan, goods
inflation actually increased relative to services in all or part of the 1990s. 
Measures of goods and services inflation
Reliably evaluating whether the recent behavior of U.S. goods and
services inflation is unusual compared to past behavior requires so-
called methodologically consistent measures of inflation. Over time, the
methods used to construct the published indexes of consumer
prices–the PCE price index and CPI–have changed significantly, due
mostly to improvements in measurement. For example, in 1983 the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) switched the basis of the CPI’s owner-
occupied housing index from the cost of purchasing a house to the
implicit rental value of the shelter provided by a house. Comparing
recent inflation data that reflect such measurement changes to historical
data that do not would be tantamount to comparing apples to oranges.
Making an apples-to-apples comparison requires the use of historical
inflation data based on the measurement methods in use today–that is,
methodologically consistent inflation data.
To ensure historical consistency, this article’s U.S. analysis relies on
published PCE chain price indexes and specially constructed, consistent
CPIs.
2 The published PCE price indexes for 1959-2003 are method-
ologically consistent. The historical data are constructed using the
current, best-available methodology.
3 In contrast, published CPIs are
not methodologically consistent, because the historical data are not
revised when measurement changes are introduced into current data (in
light of the CPI’s widespread use in many legal contracts and govern-
ment programs involving indexation). For research purposes, though,
the BLS has constructed methodologically consistent CPIs for 1978 to
2003.
4 These data, which reflect many of the methodological improve-
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INFLATION IN CORE GOODS AND SERVICES
Notes: Data are four-quarter rates of change. The CPI figures are based on methodologically consis-
tent, quarterly price indexes, formed as within-quarter averages of monthly, seasonally adjusted price
indexes. The monthly adjusted data were constructed by applying the X-11 filter to the raw unad-
justed CPI data.
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Consistent CPI
PCEments made to the published CPI since 1978, are used in this article’s
historical comparisons of goods and services inflation.
5 In all cases, U.S.
inflation is measured in so-called core terms–excluding food and energy.
With methodological consistency less important for analysis of
recent international developments and consistent data generally not
available for other economies, goods and services prices in other indus-
trialized countries are just measured by published CPIs. Methodological
consistency is less important in the international data simply because
the time span considered is shorter than in the historical U.S. analysis.
The shorter time span means fewer methodological changes have
occurred. The economies considered are those for which CPI data on
goods and services are readily available: Australia, Canada, the Euro
area, Japan, and the UK.
6
Historical U.S. evidence
Chart 1 dramatically illustrates why the recent falloff in core goods
inflation relative to services often appears in discussions of the risk of
deflation. Core goods inflation has, for the first time ever, been consis-
Chart 2
CORE PCE INFLATION IN DURABLE AND
NONDURABLE GOODS PRICES
Note: Data are four-quarter rates of change.
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Percenttently negative. Although inflation rates for both durable and non-
durable goods have declined sharply since the early 1990s, only
durables inflation has been consistently and significantly negative
(Chart 2). Thus, of those goods for which the price level (as opposed to
inflation rate) is falling, most are durables. The slowing of overall goods
inflation, of course, in part reflects the general downward inflation
trend in the economy–a decline also reflected in core services inflation.
Until overall inflation fell to its recent very low levels, the decline in
inflation was associated with the Federal Reserve’s gradual pursuit of
price stability.
When judged against services inflation, the past decade’s falloff in
core goods inflation appears somewhat unique.
7 With goods inflation
declining more than services, the past few years have seen the gap
between goods and services inflation widen sharply, to record levels in
the case of PCE inflation and near-record levels in the case of CPI infla-
tion (Chart 3). Although the differential between core goods and
services inflation has generally been trending up since the early 1990s, it
did not become unusually large by historical standards until the late
24 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Chart 3
SERVICES LESS GOODS INFLATION
Note: The plotted series measure core services inflation less core goods inflation, computed as four-
quarter rates of change in PCE and methodologically consistent CPI series.


























1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 1988
Percent1990s. Until that point, the gap between PCE goods and services
inflation was in line with the average differential that prevailed
from roughly the mid-1970s, when the gap markedly increased rel-
ative to past averages. According to methodologically consistent
CPI data, the substantial widening of the gap between core goods
and services inflation over the past decade was preceded by a larger,
but temporary, surge in the mid-1980s.
International evidence
The available international evidence indicates the decline of
goods inflation relative to services has been a partly global,
although temporary, phenomenon. Along with the United States,
the UK, Canada, and Australia experienced a fall in goods inflation
relative to services (Charts 4-6). The inflation experience of the UK
most closely resembles that of the United States. In the UK, as in
the United States, goods inflation fell very sharply relative to serv-
ices, from roughly mid-1996 to mid-2002.
8 As a result, the gap
between UK goods and services inflation reached a roughly 20-year
high in mid-2002. In Canada, too, core goods inflation declined
relative to services over the second half of the 1990s (the sharp
changes in inflation in 1991 and 1994 are due to tax changes).
Similarly, in Australia, goods inflation generally declined relative to
services in the second half of the 1990s, although, as in the United
States, the goods-services differential temporarily narrowed in the
late 1990s.
Notwithstanding the similarity in experiences over the second
half of the 1990s, in no country has the falloff in goods inflation
relative to services been as long-lasting as in the United States. To
some degree, these foreign economies that experienced a falloff in
goods inflation in the second half of the 1990s have since experi-
enced a rise in goods inflation compared to services. In the UK, for
example, goods inflation has increased significantly compared to
services since mid-2002. Canada also experienced rising goods
inflation from early 2000 through mid-2002, although goods infla-
tion has since plummeted. The more recent experiences of
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Chart 4
GOODS AND SERVICES INFLATION IN THE UK,
CANADA AND AUSTRALIA
Notes: UK data are 12-month rates of change of RPIs (1984-88) and HICPs (1989-2003) for total
(not core) goods and services. Data for Canada are 12-month rates of change for (1) goods excluding
food purchased from stores and energy and (2) services. Data for Australia are four-quarter rates of
change in CPIs excluding volatile items for (1) goods and (2) services.
Sources: Bank of England and the (UK) Office of National Statistics; Statistics Canada; and
Australian Bureau of Statistics and Reserve Bank of Australia
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Chart 5
GOODS AND SERVICES INFLATION IN THE EURO AREA 
AND JAPAN
Notes: Euro area data are 12-month rates of change of HICPs for (1) industrial goods excluding
energy and (2) services. Data for Japan are 12-month rates of change of CPIs for (1) goods and (2)
services.
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Chart 6
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF SERVICES LESS
GOODS INFLATION
Notes: UK data are 12-month rates of change of RPIs (1984-88) and HICPs (1989-2003) for total
(not core) goods and services. Data for Canada are 12-month rates of change for (1) goods excluding
food purchased from stores and energy and (2) services. Data for Australia are four-quarter rates of
change in CPIs excluding volatile items for (1) goods and (2) services. Euro area data are 12-month
rates of change of HICPs for (1) industrial goods excluding energy and (2) services. Data for Japan
are 12-month rates of change of CPIs for (1) goods and (2) services.
Sources: Bank of England and the (UK) Office of National Statistics; Statistics Canada; Australian
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Australia, Canada, and the UK all suggest the past decade’s decline in
goods inflation relative to services in the United States may prove to be
temporary. 
The experiences of Japan and Europe are even more at odds with
developments in the United States. In Japan, goods inflation fell sharply
relative to services in the first half of the 1990s, but then reversed
course. As a result, in the second half of the 1990s, the differential
between goods and services inflation fell in Japan even as it was rising
sharply in the United States and some other countries. In the Euro area,
goods inflation declined less than services inflation over the 1990s. As a
result, the differential between goods and services inflation generally
trended down during that period, although it was rising sharply for
much of the period in the United States and other countries such as the
UK. In the past few years, however, the goods-services differential for
Europe has reversed course, rising modestly, even as the differential has
declined in some other countries.
In light of such evidence showing the decline of goods inflation rel-
ative to services in the United States to be somewhat, although not
entirely, unusual, the next section examines potential explanations for
the falloff.
II.  POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS FOR THE
WIDENING GAP
Many different factors could have caused goods inflation relative to
services to fall in the United States: a deterioration in the accuracy of
measured services inflation, an increase in productivity growth for the
goods sector compared to services, increasing demand for services rela-
tive to goods, or downward pressures on goods prices due to the rising
value of the dollar or heightened global competition.
9 These explana-
tions can be distinguished by their implications for the behavior of
goods and services inflation and other economic variables. For example,
if heightened global competition were a good explanation for the
decline of goods inflation relative to services in the United States, other
countries should have experienced a decline in goods inflation com-
pared to services. In general, though, the combination of factors that30 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
best explains inflation developments in the United States might differ
from the combinations that best explain developments in other coun-
tries.
Focusing on accounting for developments in the United States, this
section sifts through the implications of the potential explanations and
their consistency with the available evidence.
10 Based on that analysis,
the past decade’s falloff of goods inflation relative to services in the
United States appears to be explained by the international forces of
dollar appreciation and, to a lesser extent, heightened global competition.
Changes in the accuracy of measured inflation
The measurement of inflation is widely thought to be subject to
biases attributable to difficulties in adjusting for changes in the quality
of goods and services. For most goods and services, both the observed
price and quality change over time. The price and quality of the typical
car, for example, have increased significantly. Some of an observed price
increase will reflect quality improvement, while some of it will represent
true inflation. The available consumer price indexes use a variety of
methods to measure quality and in turn separate the change in an item’s
price due to quality from the change that truly represents inflation.
Many experts believe the methods for measuring quality generally
understate those improvements, causing measured inflation to overstate
true inflation (Advisory Commission; Lebow and Rudd; Shapiro and
Wilcox). Moreover, many believe the measurement problem is consid-
erably more severe for services than goods (Griliches 1994; Nordhaus).
11
For example, quality can probably be more readily measured for house-
hold furniture than for legal services. As a result, the overstatement of
measured inflation, the so-called quality bias, is widely thought to be
greater for services than goods.
In light of such general measurement problems, one potential
explanation for the falloff of goods inflation relative to services is that
indexes of services inflation became even less accurate over the past
decade, due to an increase in the quality bias. For example, measured
services inflation might have declined less than the true inflation rate
for services, while measured goods inflation fell one-for-one with true
goods inflation. Such a measurement explanation might be especiallyECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2004 31
plausible in light of the sharp rise in the 1990s in the pace of techno-
logical change. More rapid technological change often brings more
rapid, harder-to-measure improvements in quality.
12 During the 1990s,
sweeping technological changes were more evident in services such as
banking, finance, and insurance than in goods (McGuckin and Stiroh;
Triplett and Bosworth 2003a). 
However, two pieces of evidence indicate changes in the accuracy of
measured inflation are unlikely to explain the falloff in goods inflation
relative to services. First, Triplett and Bosworth (2003a) argue that,
although problems remain, measurement of price and quality in the
U.S. services sector has improved dramatically over the past decade.
Measurement of goods inflation has also improved over the past decade,
but Triplett and Bosworth’s dramatic improvement in services measure-
ment would make a deterioration in services measurement relative to
goods unlikely. Second, the past decade’s widening of the gap between
goods and services inflation is evident in both PCE and methodologi-
cally consistent CPI data, even though the CPI covers fewer
hard-to-measure services than does the broader PCE price index
(Clark).
13
Changes in productivity growth
Many experts now agree that overall trend productivity growth in
the United States rose significantly starting in 1995 (Jorgenson, Ho,
and Stiroh).
14 The surprising strength of productivity growth in the last
few years has led some observers to wonder whether trend productivity
may have accelerated yet again (Gordon 2003). Faster productivity
growth is normally viewed as a positive factor for overall
inflation–unless inflation is already too low–helping to reduce inflation
pressures or inflation itself in the short run.
To the extent productivity growth rose more for the goods sector
than services, productivity shifts might help explain the falloff of goods
inflation relative to services in the United States. In the long run, as
explained by Baumol, wages will grow at the same rate in the goods and
services sectors, in order to attract workers to both sectors. But if pro-
ductivity grows faster for goods than services, firms’ costs of production
will rise less rapidly in the goods sector than in services.
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prices of goods will rise less rapidly than prices of services. Economists
have long believed there is more room for productivity growth in the
production of a good such as a stereo than in an inherently labor-inten-
sive service such as a haircut. Thus, historically, faster productivity
growth in the goods sector compared to services has been thought to
account for much of the observed gap between goods and services infla-
tion.
16 A pickup in productivity growth for goods that outstripped any
increase for services would cause goods inflation in the United States to
fall even further below services inflation.
17 Such a change in productiv-
ity might also be expected to imply a falloff in goods inflation relative to
services in some or most other industrialized countries, to the extent the
technological forces driving the productivity change are global.
There is some evidence to suggest productivity could have played a
modest role in the decline of goods inflation relative to services in the
United States. In aggregate U.S. data, productivity growth has risen
slightly more for the manufacturing sector than for the nonfarm busi-
ness economy, indicating the growth pickup has been a little larger in
the goods-producing manufacturing sector than in nonmanufacturing
sectors such as services (Table 1; McGuckin and Stiroh; Gordon
2002).
18 Detailed industry results in such studies as Nordhaus and
Stiroh also indicate the productivity growth pickup has been greater for
goods, especially durable goods, than services. The modest acceleration
Table 1
PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH, NONFARM BUSINESS AND
MANUFACTURING
Average growth in productivity (output per hour)
1973:Q1-94:Q4 1995:Q1-2003:Q4  1995-2003  less
1973-94
Nonfarm business 1.5 2.8 1.3
Manufacturing 2.7 4.2 1.5
Durable 3.0 5.4 2.4
Nondurable 2.0 2.7 0.7
Notes: Each average is estimated as the coefficient on the time trend variable in a regression of the
log level of productivity on a constant and trend, using quarterly data over the indicated periods.
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics and author’s calculationsECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2004 33
in goods relative to services shown in the aggregate productivity esti-
mates could explain a modest portion of the considerable decline in
goods inflation relative to services.
But other evidence indicates productivity to be an unlikely explana-
tion for the past decade’s decline of goods inflation relative to services.
According to some estimates, productivity growth has risen equally for
goods and services, implying equal effects of productivity on goods and
services inflation. Triplett and Bosworth (2003a,b), in the most recent
and detailed studies of the U.S. services sector, find that services indus-
tries have enjoyed a pickup in productivity growth equal to that of
goods and the aggregate economy. Triplett and Bosworth argue that the
improvement of productivity growth in services reflects the sector’s rela-
tively heavy dependence on rapidly advancing information technology.
Moreover, the decline in goods inflation occurred in only some
industrialized economies.
19 While other countries such as the UK expe-
rienced some falloff in goods inflation during the 1990s, the Euro area
experienced a rise in goods inflation relative to services. For such a con-
trast to be consistent with the productivity explanation, the acceleration
in goods productivity would have to have been markedly greater in such
countries as the United States and UK than in the Euro area. Some evi-
dence on international productivity differences in the 1990s indicates
overall productivity accelerated more in the United States than in some
other countries (Gust and Marquez, for example).
20 Yet, with arguably
better data, Jorgenson finds other countries shared in the productivity
boom of the past decade. Although economists continue to debate
whether technical innovation has spread through other industrialized
countries as much as the United States, any fundamental technological
changes would generally be expected to raise productivity in all indus-
trialized countries, consistent with Jorgenson’s evidence.
Ultimately, productivity growth in the United States has risen at
most only modestly more for goods than services, and not all industri-
alized countries have experienced a U.S.-like falloff in goods inflation
relative to services. Thus, productivity seems to be an unlikely explana-
tion for the sharp falloff of goods inflation in the United States. To the
extent productivity played a role, its contribution was probably small.34 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Rising demand for services
The past decade’s falloff in goods inflation relative to services might
also be explained by an increase in the demand for services relative to
goods. Over time, demand for consumer services such as medical care
has grown more rapidly than demand for goods such as furniture. For
example, in the United States, the share of nonfood and nonenergy
consumer spending devoted to services rose from 56 percent in 1959 to
70 percent in 2003; core goods’ share of spending declined from 44
percent to 30 percent over the same period. Basic economic theory pre-
dicts that such shifts in the composition of demand will raise the
relative price of services and could, in the short run, cause the gap
between goods and services inflation to widen.
21
However, demand shifts seem unlikely to account for the decline in
U.S. goods inflation relative to services over the past decade.
22 The
falloff in goods inflation does not seem to correspond to any sharp shift
in the demand for services. Instead, the relative demand for services has
trended up steadily for the past 40 years, as reflected in the gradual rise
in services’ share of consumer spending and decline in goods’ share
Chart 7
SHARES OF GOODS AND SERVICES IN U.S. CONSUMER
SPENDING
Note: Data are shares of spending on goods and services in total consumer spending, excluding food
and energy.
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(Chart 7). In fact, the rate of increase in services’ share of consumer
spending slowed in the early 1990s, such that services’ share of spending
rose only slightly over the past decade. 
Rising value of the dollar
Another potential explanation for the falloff in goods inflation rela-
tive to services in the United States is that goods price inflation has been
pushed down by the rise in the value of the dollar during much of the
past decade. In principle, appreciation of the dollar contributes directly
to lower overall consumer goods inflation by making imports cheaper,
to the extent foreign producers pass the cost savings of the currency
appreciation through to their U.S. prices. A rising value of the dollar
also contributes indirectly to lower goods price inflation to the extent
lower import prices and market competition push down the prices of
U.S.-produced goods. Because international trade in goods is consider-
ably greater than in services, a rising value of the dollar is likely to exert
more downward pressure on goods prices than on services. As a result,
increases in the value of the dollar could cause goods inflation to fall rel-
ative to services.
That said, exchange rate movements might not have large effects on
the differential between goods and services inflation. Historically, the
pass-through of exchange rates to goods prices has been somewhat
modest (Goldberg and Knetter; Obstfeld and Rogoff).
23 And some
research suggests pass-through has even declined in recent years
(Bernanke; Campa and Goldberg; Taylor).
24 Of course, even if pass-
through is limited, large movements in exchange rates could
significantly affect the gap between goods and services inflation.
The collective evidence suggests the substantial appreciation of the
dollar was a key force behind the growing divergence between goods
and services inflation in the United States. The increasing inflation gap
of the past decade corresponds closely to the sharp rise in the value of
the dollar from 1995 through early 2002 (Chart 8).
25 Historically, a
rising exchange rate has been associated with a growing gap between
goods and services inflation.
26 Historical evidence for some other coun-
tries such as the UK suggests a similarly close relationship between the
exchange rate and the differential between goods and services inflation36 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Chart 8
SERVICES LESS GOODS INFLATION AND THE
EXCHANGE RATE FOR THE UNITED STATES
Notes: The services less goods inflation gap is calculated from four-quarter rates of change. The
exchange rate series is an index (March 1973 = 100) of the nominal effective exchange rate based on
17 major currencies.
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Steve
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Chart 9
SERVICES LESS GOODS INFLATION AND THE
EXCHANGE RATE: THE UK AND THE EURO AREA
Notes: For the UK, the services less goods inflation gap is calculated from 12-month rates of change
in RPIs (1984-88) and HICPs (1989-2003) for total (not core) goods and services. The exchange
rate series is an index (1990 = 100) of the nominal effective sterling exchange rate. For the Euro
area, the services less goods inflation gap is calculated from 12-month rates of change of HICPs for
(1) industrial goods excluding energy and (2) services. The exchange rate series is an index (1999:Q1
= 100) of the nominal effective rate for the EER core group of currencies.
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(Chart 9; Bank of England). The past decade’s slowing of inflation in
the prices of U.S. imports of consumer goods provides yet more evi-
dence of an important role of the appreciation of the dollar in the falloff
of core goods inflation (Chart 10).
Finally, international differences in exchange rate behavior match
up reasonably well with the differences in the behavior of goods infla-
tion relative to services.27 The countries with large appreciations during
the past decade, the United States and UK, experienced the largest and
most sustained declines in goods inflation relative to services. Various
observers have at times pointed to the role of exchange rate appreciation
in the fall of goods inflation in the United States (Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System 1996,1997). Similarly, King cites cur-
rency appreciation as the cause of the late 1990s rise in the gap between
goods and services inflation in the UK. Moreover, as the aggregate
exchange rate for Euro area countries depreciated over most of the past
decade, the Euro area experienced a rise in goods inflation relative to
services (Chart 9). In still more evidence of the important role of
exchange rates, as the pound has reversed course and depreciated over
the last few years, goods inflation has risen sharply relative to services in
Chart 10
CORE PCE GOODS AND IMPORT PRICE INFLATION
Notes: Data are four-quarter rates of change. Import prices are measured with the chain price index
for imports of consumer goods excluding automobiles.
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the UK. And, as the euro has appreciated since late 2000, the gap
between goods and services inflation in the Euro area has declined
modestly.
All that said, however, exchange rates alone cannot explain the
inflation experiences of all countries. Canada’s exchange rate depreci-
ated over most of the 1990s, but the differential between goods and
services inflation trended up in the second half of the decade.
Heightened global competition
Some portion of the past decade’s falloff in goods inflation relative
to services might be due to heightened global competition. Increased
competition reflecting sharp increases in world trade and market dereg-
ulation in many countries could put downward pressure on consumer
prices. Many observers have pointed to a rising volume of imports from
such developing countries as China as a key source of downward pres-
sure on goods prices (Bank of Japan; Rogoff).
28 Developing economies
tend to be able to produce goods at relatively low cost, in part due to
their low labor costs, and thereby sell at relatively low prices. To remain
competitive in a marketplace becoming more crowded with low-cost
foreign producers, firms in industrialized economies such as the United
States must find ways to cut their costs and prices. Both the low prices
of goods produced in lower-cost countries and sold within the United
States and the price responses of U.S. producers help to lower the level
of overall U.S. consumer prices.
As is the case with a change in the exchange rate, greater competi-
tion would affect goods inflation more than services because
international trade in goods is considerably greater. The global nature of
the heightened competition would likely cause goods inflation to
decline relative to services in a wide range of industrialized countries.
However, evidence shows that the level of competition is generally
greater in the United States than in most other countries (Baily). Thus,
heightened global competition might not affect all countries to the
same extent. For example, tight regulations in some countries might
have prevented competition from rising as much as in other, less-regu-
lated countries. For those countries in which global competition has
impacted inflation, the effects should eventually run their course.40 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Increased competition should permanently lower price levels but only
temporarily reduce inflation rates, with the reduction in inflation rates
lasting only as long as necessary to lower the price level to the appropri-
ate baseline.
29
Although direct evidence is hard to identify, heightened global
competition seems likely to have played some role in the decline of
goods inflation in the United States. Inflation in the prices of imported
consumer goods slowed in the 1990s (Chart 10). Some or perhaps
much of the deceleration in prices, however, was probably due to the
appreciation of the dollar. In general, with goods inflation declining rel-
ative to services in the mid-to-late 1990s in a number of industrialized
countries, many economists have pointed to heightened competition as
a primary cause (Bank of England; Bank of Japan; King; Rogoff).
30 
But, for several reasons, increased competition appears unlikely to
be the best explanation for the sustained falloff in goods inflation rela-
tive to services in the United States.
31 First, not all economies–most
notably, the Euro area–experienced a decline in goods inflation relative
to services, although such variation across countries could be due to the
differences in competitiveness highlighted by Baily. Second, for coun-
tries such as the UK or Canada, the falloff in goods inflation relative to
services in the second half of the 1990s was followed by a sharp rise in
goods inflation compared to services in the last few years. Eventually, to
be sure, as competition’s effects on inflation rates dissipate, goods infla-
tion should rise relative to services, returning the differential to its
baseline level. But, presumably, such a reversal would occur roughly
simultaneously in the United States and other economies.
Finally, Bowman finds little evidence of higher competition in
macroeconomic indicators of competition for a range of industrial
economies. One indicator of the level of competition is the markup of
price over the cost of producing a good. More competition results in
thinner profit margins–that is, a smaller markup of price over cost. For
industrialized countries, however, macroeconomic estimates of markups
have failed to display the declines that would result from increased com-
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Putting it all together
Although few, if any, of the potential explanations for the past
decade’s falloff in U.S. goods inflation can be definitively ruled out, the
most likely explanation would seem to be the rising value of the dollar,
with heightened global competition next in line. For example, the his-
torical evidence shows a clear link between the value of the dollar and
the differential between goods and services inflation, suggesting much
of the past decade’s falloff in goods inflation relative to services is due to
the sustained rise in the value of the dollar from 1995 to 2002. More-
over, the differential between goods and services inflation tended to rise
in those countries with appreciating currencies and fall in those with
depreciating currencies. Similarly, evidence of increased world trade and
deregulation, along with the partly global aspects of the decline of
goods inflation, suggests an important role for heightened global com-
petition. But the rise in goods inflation relative to services in Europe
over the 1990s and the more recent increases in goods inflation in
countries that previously experienced sharp reductions suggest a second-
ary role of competition.
Other potential explanations for the falloff in goods inflation rela-
tive to services in the United States seem more at odds with the
evidence. A deterioration in the accuracy of measured services inflation
could in principle account for the increased differential between goods
and services inflation, but measurement of services prices appears to
have improved dramatically. Similarly, during the past decade the
United States has not experienced the sharp rise in the relative demand
for services that would be required to validate the demand explanation.
Finally, an increase in productivity growth for goods relative to services
could have contributed to the decline of goods inflation, but there does
not appear to be much evidence of a large role. For example, some data
suggest the pickup in productivity growth that began around 1995 has
been slightly greater for goods than services, but other evidence indi-
cates the increase in productivity growth has been similar across sectors.42 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
In light of the likely causes of the past decade’s falloff in goods infla-
tion relative to services in the United States, is the differential between
goods and services inflation more likely to remain at an elevated level or
decline in the period ahead? With dollar appreciation from 1995 to
2002 apparently the lead factor in the increase in the gap between
goods and services inflation, the differential seems likely to decline to a
level more in line with historical norms.32 In particular, the sharp fall in
the value of the dollar since early 2002 could be expected to yield some
reduction in the differential between goods and services inflation.33
Import price inflation has risen modestly since late 2001 and could
eventually either prevent goods inflation from falling further or cause it
to rise. Recently, the differential between goods and services inflation in
the United States has showed signs of starting to level off or narrow a
bit, even though core goods inflation has generally continued to
decline. In the mid-1980s, a sharp fall in the value of the dollar pro-
duced a significant rise in goods inflation relative to services, pulling the
differential down from then-record levels.
For these and other reasons, the risks of deflation appear to be very
small. To be sure, core goods prices have fallen consistently for much of
the past decade. But services prices have continued to rise at a healthy
rate. Much of the falloff in goods inflation relative to services appears to
be a temporary result of the rising value of the dollar during much of
the past decade. Recent declines in the value of the dollar suggest goods
inflation is likely to rise relative to services in the period ahead. Goods
inflation has already turned up in some other countries, such as the
UK, that experienced sharp falloffs in the second half of the 1990s.
Moreover, for the United States, the average private sector forecaster
anticipates modest increases in overall nonfood and nonenergy inflation
in 2004 and 2005 (Blue Chip Economic Indicators).
34 In these circum-
stances, deflation in the United States seems highly unlikely. Of course,
current circumstances reflect monetary policy’s considerable efforts to
provide enough stimulus to the economy to minimize the risk of defla-
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
Although services price inflation has historically outpaced goods
price inflation in the United States, during the past decade goods infla-
tion fell sharply relative to services. This article examines the extent to
which the past decade’s developments are unusual, what caused goods
inflation to fall relative to services, and whether the wider differential is
likely to persist. The article finds that, compared to historical U.S. and
recent international experience, the past decade’s decline in goods infla-
tion appears to be somewhat unusual. For example, goods inflation
relative to services fell in many countries, such as the UK, but rose in
the Euro area. Although a number of causal forces could be at work, the
past decade’s fall in goods inflation in the United States is most likely
due to dollar appreciation and, to a lesser extent, increased global com-
petition. Accordingly, the differential between goods and services
inflation seems likely to return to more normal levels in coming years.44 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
ENDNOTES
1Gagnon, Sabourin, and Lavoie, in a study published after this article was
written, also provide historical and international evidence on differentials
between goods and services inflation, focusing on the global rise in the differen-
tial in 2002.
2PCE indexes are the FOMC’s preferred measures of consumer prices
(Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2000). Clark reviews the pros
and cons of the PCE price index and CPI. The introduction of a chain index ver-
sion of the CPI in 2002 has to some degree, although not entirely, narrowed the
conceptual and quantitative differences between the measures (Wu).
3Because the Bureau of Economic Analysis does not report separate PCE
price indexes for core goods and services, the series were constructed from the
appropriate component price indexes using the chain index methodology recom-
mended by Whelan. Various other PCE series considered in the article, such as
inflation in core nondurables, were constructed with the same approach.
4The current-methods indexes incorporate most, although not all, of the
improvements made to the published CPI since 1978 (Stewart and Reed). For
example, the current-methods CPI adjusts historical computer prices to reflect
current methods, but data limitations preclude incorporating any of the recent
improvements to medical care prices into the historical price index. The method-
ologically consistent CPI series for core goods and services were constructed by
Stephen Reed of the BLS, for use in this analysis. The monthly, seasonally unad-
justed data for 1978-2002 provided by the BLS were spliced to the published
CPI series for 2003.
5Although there are many differences in the behavior of the published and
methodologically consistent CPI series, the most notable is associated with the
1983 change in the treatment of housing. Prior to 1983, but not from 1983 on,
changes in interest rates cause significant movements in the housing component
of the published CPI and, in turn, the published core services CPI. The method-
ologically consistent CPI for core services does not suffer such pre-1983 swings.
Most notably, soaring interest rates in the late 1970s and early 1980s cause the
published series for CPI services to be far higher than the methodologically con-
sistent series.
6Technically, inflation in the UK and Euro area is measured with so-called
harmonized indexes of consumer prices, or HICPs (although the data for the UK
prior to 1989 are retail price indexes, or RPIs). As indicated in the notes to the
charts, in several cases the data are for overall, rather than core, inflation.
7More formal statistical analysis–Andrews and Bai and Perron (1998, 2003)
tests for shifts in the average gap between core goods and services inflation–yields
mixed evidence of a permanent increase in the gap sometime during the past
decade. There appears to be slightly stronger evidence of a shift in the mid-1970s.
For example, Bai-Perron tests applied to 1959-2003 PCE data for core goods less
services inflation yield a statistically significant shift in the mid-1970s, but none
in the last decade. But as measured by methodologically consistent CPI data for
1978-2003, there appears to be a significant decline in goods inflation relative to
services (in the form of an increase in the average differential) in 2000:Q1.ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2004 45
8Because of the more limited availability of core measures of goods and
services inflation, the reported figures for the UK are based on overall rather than
core measures of HICP inflation. In RPI measures of inflation, the 1994-2002
divergence between goods and services inflation is even sharper in core measures
(provided by the Office of National Statistics) than in overall measures.
9Brauer examines three explanations for the gap between goods and services
inflation over the period 1959 to 1993: measurement problems; higher produc-
tivity growth for the goods sector; and rising relative demand for services. Brauer
concludes that while measurement problems are an important factor in the gap,
the most important factor is the rising demand for services. Gagnon, Sabourin,
and Lavoie argue the long-term difference between goods and services inflation is
largely explained by faster productivity growth in the goods sector, although the
rising openness of goods markets and rising demand for services also contribute.
10Another potential cause of the falloff in goods inflation relative to serv-
ices–the business cycle–does not seem to have played much of a role. Because
goods and services inflation tend to post similar increases during expansions and
declines in recessions, the gap between goods and services inflation has little rela-
tionship to the business cycle (Chart 3). Most recently, for example, the differen-
tial generally rose during not only the expansion of 1991-2000 but also the
recession of 2000-01. Statistical analyses based on the comovement metrics of
Stock and Watson (1999) and simple inflation–output gap models confirm the
weak correlation of relative goods inflation to the business cycle. Moreover, for-
mal statistical tests yield little evidence of shifts in the business cycle behavior of
the differential between goods and services inflation.
11See also the Griliches (1992) volume.
12Just as Griliches (1994) suggested for overall productivity, the rising rela-
tive importance of some especially hard-to-measure components such as medical
care might result in a modestly greater quality bias in overall services inflation.
But any changes in the quality bias of overall services inflation due to changes in
the composition of services seem likely to be small. From a “cursory look” at PCE
data, Griliches suggested the largest hard-to-measure components of services are
those covering housing, medical, insurance, legal, entertainment, and education
services. The share of core PCE services spending devoted to medical care rose
from 23.3 percent in 1980 to 27.1 percent in 2000. The share of spending on
personal business, which includes components such as legal services, also rose,
from 12.1 percent in 1980 to 14.2 percent in 2000. But housing’s share of core
services spending fell from 25.2 percent in 1980 to 22.8 percent in 2000. The
effects of the decline in housing’s share probably largely offset the rising shares of
other hard-to-measure components, resulting in little change in the quality bias
in overall services inflation. Moreover, Gordon’s (2002) and Nordhaus’ findings
of only minor composition effects on aggregate productivity growth suggest com-
position effects are likely to be small for inflation.
13While the CPI’s coverage is limited to those services sold to consumers, the
PCE price index covers other services provided for free or by nonprofit institu-
tions. For example, the PCE index includes estimates of prices of free checking
services and religious services. Such considerations suggest the quality bias in the46 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
CPI measure of services to be smaller. Yet there are some components included in
both indexes, such as medical care, for which PCE price measurement is thought
to be more accurate than the CPI’s.
14The evolution of trend productivity growth since the early 1970s and the
role of information technology has been the subject of an immense literature.
Although a complete survey is beyond the scope of this article, some of the key
studies include, in addition to those cited elsewhere in the article, Baily and Gor-
don, Council of Economic Advisors, Gordon (2000), Jorgenson and Stiroh, and
Oliner and Sichel.
15The phenomenon of slower productivity growth in the services sector
causing services’ costs to rise more rapidly than goods’ costs has been coined Bau-
mol’s disease.
16For example, King attributes the long-term gap between goods and serv-
ices inflation observed across a range of countries to faster productivity growth for
goods.
17A permanent increase in productivity growth for goods would result in a
permanent increase in the gap between goods and services inflation. A temporary
increase in productivity growth (reflecting a permanent increase in the level of
productivity) would imply a temporary rise in the inflation differential.
18Some caution is warranted in drawing implications for consumer goods
and services inflation from the available aggregate or industry productivity data.
The available industry classifications of mining, manufacturing, wholesale and
retail trade, services, etc., do not directly translate into consumer sectors. More-
over, the industry data often reflect the production of goods or services used as
inputs in the production of other goods. As Triplett and Bosworth (2001)
explain, understatement of productivity growth in an industry providing an inter-
mediate good or service could lead to important differences across industries but
have little impact on aggregate productivity growth.
19The productivity explanation also seems at odds with the temporary
nature of the decline in goods inflation relative to services in some countries.
Although goods inflation relative to services was generally declining in the United
States from the early 1990s through 2003, the foreign economies that experi-
enced a falloff in goods inflation in the second half of the 1990s have since expe-
rienced a rise in goods inflation compared to services. Yet if faster productivity
growth in goods were a good explanation, a continued large differential in the
United States should be accompanied by still-large differentials in the other coun-
tries for which goods inflation fell significantly relative to services in the latter
1990s.
20Some observers have suggested that, among industrialized countries, the
productivity experience of Australia has most closely resembled that of the United
States. In the 1990s, aggregate productivity growth rose even more in Australia
than in the United States, in part due to deregulation of the Australian economy
(Gruen; Gruen and Stevens). In light of the important contribution of deregula-
tion to Australia’s productivity acceleration and other differences in inflation and
productivity experiences, it is difficult to assess whether the behavior of produc-
tivity and the differential between goods and services inflation in Australia versus
the United States supports or weighs against the productivity explanation.ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2004 47
21However, the inflation effects of an increase in the relative demand for
services would be short-lived. Theoretically, only differences in productivity
growth (or the quality bias in measurement) can account for persistent or long-
term differences between goods and services inflation. See, for example, the dis-
cussion in De Gregorio, Giovannini, and Wolf.
22A second problem for the demand explanation is that, even though the
demand for services compared to goods has trended upward in most industrial-
ized economies (see, for example, Gagnon, Sabourin, and Lavoie), the gap
between goods and services rose in only some economies.
23More specifically, the pass-through of exchange rates to prices of imported
goods is somewhat modest (Goldberg and Knetter; Obstfeld and Rogoff). And,
the changes in import prices that do occur have limited effects on domestic prices
(Obstfeld and Rogoff; Swagel).
24Pass-through appears to have declined in not only the United States but
also many other countries.
25The significant difference in the timing of the decelerations in U.S.
durables and nondurables prices over the past decade could be seen as posing a
difficulty for the exchange rate explanation. Essentially, nondurables inflation fell
sharply in the early 1990s and then remained roughly flat, while durables infla-
tion only began to drop in the mid-1990s (Chart 3). The increase in the value of
the dollar might be expected to affect durables and nondurables inflation at
roughly the same time, to the extent international trade and market competitive-
ness are roughly the same for the durables and nondurables sectors.
26Estimates of simple models relating the gap between goods and services
inflation to the lagged inflation gap, the output gap, and the percent change in
the exchange rate confirm the relationship indicated in the chart.
27Gagnon, Sabourin, and Lavoie, in a study published after this article was
written, make the same observation.
28Some observers have linked the beginning of increased competition to the
so-called globalization that commenced with the fall of the Berlin Wall.
29Rogoff argues that heightened global competition will produce a perma-
nent reduction in the rate of overall inflation, because the reduction in the
markup of price over marginal cost driven by heightened competition will reduce
the incentive for central banks to continually stimulate the economy to achieve
higher levels of output and employment. But because the reduction in inflation
stems from a change in monetary policy, the long-term differential between goods
and services inflation would be unaffected. The heightened competition would
lower the price level of goods relative to services, but not the long-term differen-
tial in inflation rates.
30See also Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1996,1997)
for discussions of the role of heightened global competition in the decline of
goods inflation. Jenkins suggests the “recent divergence of inflation between
goods and services in many industrialized countries” is partly due to heightened
competition in goods markets and rising relative demand for services associated
with rising productivity and income growth. 48 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
31What is more, although heightened global competition might be expected
to affect durables and nondurables inflation at roughly the same time, the decel-
eration in durables and nondurables prices in the United States differed signifi-
cantly in timing.
32Similarly, although global competition may continue to keep the levels of
goods prices low, the recent increases in goods inflation relative to services
observed in some industrialized countries suggest the waning of competition’s
effects on inflation rates.
33Over the past few years, exchange rate depreciation in other countries
such as the UK has been accompanied by a rise in goods inflation relative to serv-
ices, reversing declines that occurred during the second half of the 1990s.
34In a special question included in the February survey, the average Blue
Chip respondent projected core CPI inflation of 1.5 percent in 2004 and 1.9 per-
cent in 2005, up from 1.1 percent in 2003 (12-month percent changes).ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2004 49
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